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offering (IPO) and seasoned equity offering (SEO) firms from 1975 to 1992, we find that underperformance
is concentrated primarily in small issuing firms with low book-to-market ratios. SEO firms, that underperform
these standard benchmarks have time series returns that covary with factor returns constructed from
nonissuing firms. We conclude that the stock returns following equity issues reflect a more pervasive return
pattern in the broader set of publicly traded companies.
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Introduction
Long-run performance anomalies have become a growth area within the academic finance
literature.  For example, they range from firm underperformance following mergers [Asquith (1993)
and Agarawal, Jaffe and Mandelker (1992)], dividend omissions [Michaely, Thaler, and Womack
(1995)], exchange listing changes [Dharan and Ikenberry (1995)] and firm overperformance following
share repurchases [Ikenberry, Lakonishok and Vermaelen (1995)].  In addition, Ritter (1991),
Loughran and Ritter (1995), and Spiess and Affleck-Graves (1995) show that stock market
performance subsequent to initial public offerings (IPOs) and seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) is poor.
 Both sets of authors explain underperformance in terms of investor sentiment: investors in SEOs and
IPOs systematically underreact to the bad news conveyed in an equity issue.1
This paper examines the pervasiveness of underperformance by equity issuers.  We show that
the underperformance can be narrowed to a smaller dimension phenomenon: IPO returns are similar to
the returns on similar size and book-to-market nonissuing firms while SEO returns covary with size,
book-to-market, and momentum portfolios composed of nonissuing firms. Value weighting equity
issuer returns substantially reduces underperformance relative to a broad number of benchmarks. 
Moreover, when we match IPOs and SEOs to benchmark firms on the basis of firm characteristics and
employ the Fama-French (1993) 3-factor model or the 4-factor Carhart (1997) extension of that
model, we find that underperformance is not robust. These results support the analysis in Brav and
Gompers (1997), which compared the performance of venture and nonventure capital-backed IPOs to
                                               
1 Other papers that examine long run stock returns subsequent to issuances of corporate securities
include Jegadeesh (1998) and Eckbo (1998) for equity and Spiess and Affleck-Graves (1998) for
debt.
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various benchmarks and found that matching IPOs to similar size and book-to-market firms eliminated
the underperformance.
We also examine whether our approach suffers from lack of power to detect abnormal
performance as discussed in Loughran and Ritter (1998).  Loughran and Ritter argue that using
benchmarks and factor returns that themselves contain a large number of issuing firms reduces the
power of performance tests.  We find that purging benchmarks and factor returns of issuing firms,
however, does not substantially change the factor regression results or the characteristics-matched
performance mentioned above. In addition, we provide evidence that simple least squares regressions
do not suffer from lack of power as argued in Loughran and Ritter (1998).
We also show that factor models can provide insights into potential abnormal performance that
characteristics-based approaches miss, e.g., changes in riskiness that are not correlated with changes in
characteristics.  The time series of returns on SEO firms is highly correlated with the return on the
smallest and lowest book-to-market firms which have not issued equity, indicating that their
performance is not a unique issuer effect.
Furthermore, we document that SEO underperformance is not increasing in the number of
offerings beyond the first.  In fact, second and subsequent seasoned offerings exhibit increases in
average performance compared with first issuances, with underperformance either entirely disappearing
or becoming statistically, if not economically, imperceptible.  The pattern of SEO performance vis a vis
firm size also remains robust for subsequent issuances.
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While we are agnostic about whether covariation of equity issuer returns with a small number
of portfolios is evidence of risk or sentiment, the results clearly point to the smaller dimensional issues
present in the sample.  Equity issuer returns are not a unique anomaly, even if they remain unexplained.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section I discusses issues related to long-run
performance evaluation and provides background for the methodologies used in the paper.  Section II
presents the data and summary statistics.  Section III explores the empirical underperformance of
seasoned equity offerings and initial public offerings.  Section IV reviews related results.  Section V
concludes the paper and presents recommendations for future research.
I. Performance tests, time horizons, trading strategies, and methodology
In this section we present the economic framework for our analysis.  We do not seek to
develop new methodologies for evaluating long-run performance.  Instead we hope to place this work
squarely in the debate on approaches to long-run performance measurement and what we can
confidently conclude from the data concerning a particular event given various approaches. 
Specifically, because we have no theory to guide our choice of portfolio formation and benchmark
selection, the methodology used in any study implicitly takes a position in this debate, a position that is
perhaps arbitrary.  By comparing alternative estimation approaches, we can examine the robustness of
performance measurements for equity issuers.
First, one component underpinning long-run performance tests in this and other research
investigating financial market anomalies is the choice of trading strategy implicit in the performance
measurement methodology.  Any study taking a position on the relative performance of specific classes
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of securities must also take a position on the portfolio formation rules used to generate those returns if
an aggregate measure of relative performance is to be calculated and conclusions are to be drawn from
the experiment.  Similarly, any performance test must have some notion of what “normal” returns are. 
For example, financial theory typically suggests that if there are pervasive and measurable sources of
economic risk or if firm characteristics help determine the nature of expected returns, then in order to
assess relative performance correctly, the researcher must match these returns to returns on
benchmarks composed of firms whose fundamental riskiness or return-determining characteristics are
similar to the target group.
Thus, performance tests are joint tests of the no abnormal performance null hypothesis, the
formal model, and the trading rules or portfolio formation strategies invoked. While most authors
recognize that abnormal performance measurement is always conditional on an asset-pricing model,
there has been little effort to examine how the choice of abnormal performance measurement affects
inferences. Recently, Barber and Lyons (1997), Kothari and Warner (1997), Lyons, Barber, and Tsai
(1998), Brav (1998), Mitchell and Stafford (1998), and Fama (1998) have begun to fill this gap. These
authors argue that the choice of a performance measurement methodology directly determines both the
size and power of the statistical test.  In this paper, by varying models, trading rules, and benchmarks,
we contribute to the understanding of how these choices can lead to different conclusions in general
and demonstrate how fragile certain aspects of the results in the literature to date actually are.
In addition, many subtle sub-issues comprise the overall performance test design conundrum. 
For example, conditional on any abnormal performance methodology and asset-pricing model, should
sample firm returns be equal or value weighted?  Obviously, under the null, this question is redundant
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yet, as Loughran and Ritter (1998) point out, the choice of the weighting scheme is important due to
power considerations. To illustrate this point consider a simple scenario in which a sample contains
1,000 firms, 999 of which have a $1 million market capitalization (the “small” firms) and one firm that
has a  $1,001 million market capitalization (the “large” firm). Assume that the small firms have all
underperformed by an equal percentage rate equal to 50% while the large firm has overperformed by
50%. It is easy to see that an equal weighted measure of abnormal performance will indicate severe
mispricing (-50%) while value weighting will lead the researcher to conclude that the sample abnormal
performance is virtually zero. Which method should we use? Indeed, the first provides strong evidence
against market efficiency while the other does not.
We argue that if an alternative hypothesis suggests that small stocks are likely to be mispriced
more than large stocks, then power considerations alone [Loughran and Ritter (1998))] imply the use
of equal weighting.  If the researcher’s goal, however, is to quantify investors’ average wealth change
subsequent to an event -- and this seems to be the goal of most long horizon event studies -- then it
follows that value-weighting is the correct method. In the above example half of the invested wealth
lost 50% of its value while the second half gained 50% resulting in no net gain or loss in average
wealth.  Since part of our motivation is the Loughran and Ritter (1995) claim that investing in issuing
firms is hazardous to investors’ wealth, we believe that value-weighting generally provides the right
metric from an economic point of view. Furthermore, the equal weighted approach gives a firm with a
market capitalization of $1 million the same weight in performance tests as a $1,001 million company. 
It would be unusual for a large institutional investor to hold an equal weighted portfolio, so value
weighted performance may provide a more useful benchmark.  The prescription for investment
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strategies is quite different depending upon the weighting.  Nevertheless, we also present results using
equal weighting to highlight cross-sectional differences in abnormal performance wherever they are
present.
Another important issue is the choice of abnormal performance measurement itself.   All risk-
adjusting or characteristics matching strategies are not the same.  For example, is a firm's risk or
characteristic matched only once and then assumed to be constant through time?  A second possibility
is to reapply the matching procedure at the beginning of each period.  The former is the generic choice
of a buy-and-hold “naïve” trader.  The latter is the choice of an informed trader for whom data-
gathering and transactions costs related to frequent trading and the costly alteration of short positions
are low.  We explore both methods of calculating returns in this paper.
The choice is crucial.  Buy-and-hold returns may be more important for an individual, naïve
investor who makes portfolio allocation choices only infrequently.  Because the expected returns for a
purely naïve investor are of interest to many mutual fund managers, this might argue against the idea of
controlling for changing economic risk or firm characteristics through time.  Large institutional
investors, however, trade quite frequently and monthly portfolio rebalancing may be the relevant
benchmark.
Barber and Lyon (1997), Lyon, Barber, and Tsai (1998) and Kothari and Warner (1997)
provide thorough evidence regarding the specification of various abnormal performance methodologies
that have been applied in previous research.  While no clear winner has emerged as the universally
optimal methodology in terms of statistical properties, Fama (1998) and Mitchell and Stafford (1998)
have both provided additional considerations regarding the merits of such methodologies. They argue
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that abnormal performance measures such as cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) and time-series
regressions at the monthly frequency, for example, are less likely to yield spurious rejections of market
efficiency relative to methodologies that calculate buy-and-hold returns by compounding single period
returns.  First, the buy-and-hold method can magnify underperformance, even if it occurs in only a
single period due to the nature of compounding single-period returns. Second, distributional properties
and test statistics for cumulative abnormal returns are better understood.  Loughran and Ritter (1998),
however, critique the use of time-series factor models.  They argue that by weighting time periods
equally, as opposed to weighting events equally, these models will not capture periods of misvaluation
that may affect multiple firms.  They also suggest that factor models suffer from benchmark
contamination, i.e., the factors used to explain returns contain the returns of issuing firms and will
therefore covary with issuer portfolios by construction.2 
Furthermore, a researcher should always ask whether the trading strategies upon which
performance tests are built are implementable by an investor. The strategy of centering IPOs and SEOs
in event-time and then measuring performance with respect to chosen benchmarks may prove to be an
interesting and informative intellectual exercise. Yet, it is not necessarily a strategy that can be easily
used by an investor who operates in calendar-time with less than perfect knowledge of the future.  This
investor would need to know in advance the number of issues to be undertaken in the future in order to
fully implement this strategy, for example. In contrast to the event-time approach, calendar-time
                                               
2 These authors also argue that value-weighting returns is inappropriate because small firms are more
likely to be affected by misvaluation. 
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strategies are implementable by an investor and they provide evidence on the joint temporal behavior of
the firms under study.
Our approach with respect to buy-and-hold versus rebalancing techniques is to present both
types of calculations taken in event time as well as calendar time and compare them. Several of our
calendar time results, however, represent tests from strategies that are potentially more implementable.
 Nevertheless, we recognize that inference may be aided by event-time centering.
Another issue also relates to the formation of benchmarks.  Simply picking one security
deemed to be similar on the basis of firm-specific accounting or price-based characteristics is potentially
an extremely noisy procedure for matching firm risk characteristics.  Attempting to preclassify, or sort
the universe of securities into portfolios representing a “smoothed” measure of the important
underlying characteristic may be a better way of controlling for risk characteristics that affect expected
returns.  We recognize, however, that such an approach biases statistical tests of abnormal performance
by inducing skewness in the distribution of return differences as noted by Lyons, Barber, and Tsai
(1998).  We therefore do not attempt formal statistical analyses of tests for differences in these means. 
Additionally, the portfolio matching method implicitly assumes that the universe of stocks from which a
benchmark return is constructed is rationally priced.  For example, if we believed that a subset of this
universe, e.g., IPOs, and SEOs were irrationally priced, this assumption might be difficult to maintain. 
We present results calculated using overall universe of stocks as well as the universe of stocks purged
of IPOs and SEOs and discuss benchmark-relative results with the caveats noted above in mind.
The time period over which returns are estimated can make large differences in firms’ returns if
risks or characteristics used in the benchmark-matching phase have a time-varying component of low
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frequency.  If firms that issue equity have returns that covary with a business-cycle frequency pattern in
overall returns, the information provided by a given trading strategy might actually contain few insights
over short periods of time.  For example, firms that issued equity in 1981-1983 may have significant
covariation in returns.  This is especially true if they are in the same or similar industries, have similar
size, or are financed in a similar manner.  Statistical tests that treat each observation independently will
greatly overstate the economic significance of any performance differential and may result in the flawed
inference that ignores these low-frequency characteristics of IPO and SEO underperformance.
As a second example, consider the case of small firms whose historical returns and, arguably,
risks have proven to be greater than a typical large firm's returns and risks.  Small firms experienced a
depression of sorts in the 1980’s as discussed in Fama and French (1995).  Trading strategies using
data from only that period, or weighted heavily in that period, may speciously determine that returns on
small firms are low, especially when considering their implicit risk.  In this case, the choice of time
horizon and period lead to potentially erroneous conclusions as the true number of informative business
cycle frequency observations is small over the trading rule's time horizon.  In other words, if IPO or
SEO returns are not independent, the true number of events is not the number of IPOs or SEOs.
Finally, we examine whether the performance of repeat issuers is any different from the
performance of firms that undertake an SEO for the first time.  We therefore conduct separate tests for
firms undertaking SEOs for the first time and for those which raise capital in a second and subsequent
SEOs and examine their performance independently.
II. Data
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Our sample of seasoned equity offerings was identified in the Investment Dealers' Digest of
Corporate Financing for the period 1975-1992.  Jay Ritter provided data on seasoned equity offerings
for the period 1975-1984.  For inclusion in our sample, a firm performing a seasoned equity offering
must be followed by CRSP sometime after the offering date.  Our sample includes 4,526 offerings
made by 2,772 firms.3  Figure 1 gives the time series of SEOs in our sample.  The pattern shows clear
evidence of clustering.  For example, times of active seasoned issuance are also active IPO markets
(Figure 2).  Unlike an IPO in which a firm by definition can only go public once, many firms in our
sample are multiple issuers.  1,783 (64.3%) firms perform only one seasoned equity issue; 614 (22.2%)
issue twice; 211 (7.6%) issue three times; 81 (2.9%) issue four times; 35 (1.3%) issue five times; 17
(0.6%) issue six times; and 31 (1.1%) issue seven times or more.  Figure 1 also shows the distribution
of issues by exchange.  In the 1970s, most SEOs were New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) firms. 
Over the sample period, however, NASDAQ firms began to account for a larger fraction of issuances.
Our sample of initial public offerings is collected from various issues of the Investment
Dealers' Digest of Corporate Financing for the period 1975-1995 as well as from the Securities
Data Corporation database.  For inclusion in our sample, a firm performing an IPO must be
followed by the Center for Research in Securities Prices (CRSP) at some point after the offering
date.  Our final sample includes 4,622 IPOs for the period 1975-1992.
Our data set is slightly different from those of Loughran and Ritter (1995) and Spiess and
Affleck-Graves (1995) in several ways.  First, unlike Loughran and Ritter, we exclude all unit offerings
                                               
3 We include all seasoned equity offerings, both pure primary share offerings and combination
primary and secondary share offerings.
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from our sample because separating the value of the offerings' components (usually common stock
with warrants) is difficult.  We also choose to include utilities in our sample even though Loughran and
Ritter exclude them.  The potential impact of including utilities is small for two reasons.  First, they
comprise only 5.5% of either sample.  Second, in unreported results we reestimated our results
excluding utilities and the results were qualitatively identical.  In addition, unlike Spiess and Affleck-
Graves who look only at offerings that are entirely primary shares, we include offerings that also have a
secondary component in which management sells some of their shares in the offering, i.e., we include
both pure primary offerings and combination primary and secondary offerings.  If, as Myers and Majluf
(1984) suggest, managers attempt to sell their shares when they perceive them to be overvalued, then
inclusion of these issues may reinforce the long-run underperformance effect we find in the data as the
market revises its assessment of these firms' prospects.  Including secondary issues along with primary
issues is conservative in this sense.  We do not expect that the differences between our sample and
those of Loughran and Ritter (1995) and Spiess and Affleck-Graves should impart any particular biases
to our conclusions.
In the analyses that follow, we examine the size and book-to-market characteristics of our
sample.  Starting in January of 1964, we use all New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) stocks to create
size quintile breakpoints.4  Size is measured as the number of shares outstanding times the stock price
at the end of the preceding month.  We obtain our accounting measures from the COMPUSTAT
quarterly and annual files and define book value as book common equity plus balance sheet deferred
                                               
4Fama and French (1992) use only NYSE stocks to create the breakpoints in order to ensure dispersion
in the characteristics across portfolios.  Like Fama and French, however, our benchmarks allocate all
stocks (NYSE, American Stock Exchange (ASE), and NASDAQ) to one of the 25 portfolios.
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taxes and investment tax credits for the fiscal quarter ending two quarters before the sorting date.  This
is the same definition as in Fama and French (1992).  If the book value is missing from the quarterly
statements, we search for it in the annual files.5  We form book-to-market quintile breakpoints using
only NYSE firms and then form 25 (5x5) size and book-to-market portfolios by intersecting the
portfolio breakpoints and allocating all firms into these portfolios.6
These breakpoints also create 25 portfolios to which each SEO or IPO firm can be
assigned.  For the sample of SEO firms, we calculate the market value of the firm one month prior
to the issuance.  For IPO firms, we calculate the market value of equity at the first month after the
offering.  We calculate book values using Compustat data. Book values for SEO firms are six
months prior to the offering to allow for reporting lag.  For book value of equity of IPO firms we
use COMPUSTAT and record the first book value after the IPO as long as it is within eighteen
months of the offering month7.  The bias in book value should not be too great because the
increment in book value due to retained earnings in the first year is likely to be very small for
newly public companies. 
Table 1 presents the size and book-to-market portfolio distribution for the IPO sample. IPOs
are heavily weighted in the small, low book-to-market portfolios.  Over half (51.8%) of the IPO firms
are in the smallest, lowest book to market portfolio (i.e., the (1,1) portfolio).  Two thirds of the IPO
firms are in the smallest quintile of stocks.  Similarly, less than 1% of the IPOs are in the largest quintile
                                               
5For firms that are missing altogether from the quarterly files, we use the annual files.
6We do not include stocks with negative book values.
7 Shortening this interval does not affect any of the results that we report later although it leads to
a smaller sample size.
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of stocks when breakpoints are defined by NYSE firms.  In terms of book-to-market ratios, over 77%
of the IPO firms have book-to-market ratios in the lowest quintile when breakpoints are defined by
NYSE stocks.
It is not surprising that the sample tends to have this bias.  Smaller firms may generate less
internal cash and may thus need to issue equity to finance expansion.  Similarly, managers of smaller
firms may have substantially larger equity stakes in the firms and want to reduce their holdings via
secondary offerings.  The low book-to-market grouping may be explained in one of two ways.  First,
the low book-to-market ratios may represent future growth options.  These firms are "growth" firms
and may have many good investment opportunities for which they need to raise cash.  On the other
hand, the low book-to-market ratio for these firms may just be an indicator of relative overpricing. 
Loughran and Ritter (1995) argue that issuers time the market for new shares when their firms are
relatively overvalued.
We present summary statistics for the SEOs in Table 2 where we show the distribution of SEO
firms by their ranking in the 5x5 size and book-to-market portfolios.  While the SEO sample is heavily
weighted in the smallest and the lowest book-to-market firms, it is substantially more evenly distributed
than the IPO sample.  Only 24% of the SEO sample is in the (1,1) portfolio, less than half the fraction
of IPO firms that fall in the (1,1) portfolio.  Almost 8% of the seasoned equity-issuing firms are in the
largest quintile of NYSE stocks and twice as many SEO firms are outside of the lowest book-to-
market quintile.  These differences lead us to examine the performance of IPO and SEO firms
separately.
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III. Underperformance of Equity Issuers
A. Full Sample Results
We utilize various benchmarks to measure SEO and IPO long-run performance throughout this
paper.  First, the performance of issuing firms is matched to several broad market indexes.  The S&P
500, NASDAQ composite index, CRSP value weighted index, and CRSP equal weighted index are all
compared to equity issuer performance.8
We also create control samples which will be assumed to represent “normal” returns by
matching issuing firms with groups of firms drawn from the universe of stocks based on firm
characteristics.  These characteristics are firm size and book-to-market or size, book-to-market, and
price momentum portfolios.  We form size and book-to-market portfolios as described in the previous
section.9  We create the 25 size and book-to-market portfolios each quarter. In order to eliminate the
benchmark bias discussed in Loughran and Ritter (1998), we eliminate all IPO and SEO firms from the
benchmark portfolios.  We do this for a period of five years after their issuance.  Equal weighted
returns are calculated for each portfolio for the next three months.  We repeat the above procedure for
January, April, July, and October of each year.
Momentum breakpoints are calculated as follows. Starting in January 1964, we first form size
quartile breakpoints using NYSE firms only. Then, within each size quartile we form quartile book-to-
                                               
8 CRSP equal- and value-weighted indexes include all stocks listed on the NYSE, ASE, and
NASDAQ.
9 While breakpoints are based only on NYSE stocks, all CRSP-listed stocks are allocated to one
of the 25 portfolios.
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market breakpoints that are in turn split further into quartile momentum breakpoints. Size and book-to-
market are calculated as described in the previous paragraph. Momentum is calculated as the buy and
hold return over the previous year excluding the month before the sorting date. This sorting procedure
results in 64 (4x4x4) possible portfolios into which we allocate the entire universe of CRSP-listed firms
(i.e., all NYSE, ASE, and NASDAQ stocks), a manageable number that maintains a level of
aggregation comparable to previous studies.10 Unlike the portfolio formation based on accounting
measures, we repeat the momentum-based formation process monthly.  For each of the 64 portfolios,
we calculate equal weighted monthly returns.
Table 3 presents long-run performance for the sample of SEOs from an event time strategy in
which each SEO constitutes an event.  Panel A calculates buy-and-hold returns.  To construct our
figures, we use the monthly tapes and follow each offering beginning in the month after the event for
the earlier of 60 months or the delisting month.  Our buy-and-hold intervals are set to match those
chosen by Loughran and Ritter (1995). 
On the left-hand side of Panel A, we equal weight the returns of the SEOs and their
benchmarks. Loughran and Ritter (1995) and Spiess and Affleck-Graves (1995) calculate wealth
relatives for the five year period by taking the ratio of one plus the equal weighted return on the SEO
                                                                                                                                                      
10 We use only quartile breakpoints when we form size, book-to-market, and momentum
benchmarks because finer divisions of firms (i.e., quintiles) leave certain portfolios with very few
stocks.
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portfolio over one plus the equal weighted return on the chosen benchmark.  We also report the
average excess return of the SEO over the chosen benchmark.
The wealth relatives in Panel A are very similar to those in Loughran and Ritter and Spiess and
Graves.  The five-year wealth relative is less than 1.0 for all benchmarks, ranging from 0.84 to 0.89. 
The five-year excess returns are all negative, anywhere from –19.5% versus the NASDAQ Composite
index to –30.1% versus the S&P 500 index. 
Unlike Ritter and Loughran, we make no attempt to match SEOs to individual firms. Loughran
and Ritter (1995) match firms on size.  They also require the matching firm to be a nonissuing firm for
at least five years.  Therefore, because NASDAQ returns are picked up by CRSP in 1972, 1978 is the
first year that any NASDAQ firm can be used as a matching firm in their study.  As Table 2 shows,
most issuing firms tend to be small.  By matching the early sample to small NYSE/ASE firms,
Loughran and Ritter may be matching SEO firms to the DeBondt and Thaler (1985,1987) long-term
loser firms that we know outperform similarly sized firms.  Their benchmark therefore may be biased
towards finding underperformance. We avoid this potential problem.
The right half of panel A presents value weighted results for our sample. As mentioned
previously, value weighted performance may be an economically more meaningful construct than equal
weighted performance. In Panel A, value weighting reduces underperformance, but does not do away
with it.  Wealth relatives are now between 0.87 and 0.93 and the excess return is between –14.2 and –
25%.  This indicates that small issuers underperform more than large issuers.
In Panel B of Table 3, we calculate the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) for the five years
following the issuance.  The CARs are all substantially less than the excess returns calculated in Panel
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A.  In fact, the average CARs are between -8% and -17% in the value weighted SEO sample.  While
value weighting increases CARs relative to the broad market benchmarks, there is little change in
performance relative to the size and book-to-market or size, book-to-market, and momentum
portfolios.  The results in Table 3 clearly show that the underperformance of SEO firms is magnified by
the calculation of buy-and-hold returns.
The returns of the IPO sample are similarly explored in Table 4.  Once again, we present buy-
and-hold returns in Panel A and cumulative abnormal returns in Panel B. The results are similar in both
panels.  On an equal-weighted basis, IPO firms underperform broad market benchmarks by a wide
margin, underperforming the S&P by 44% and NASDAQ by 31%.  Value weighting the IPO firm
returns cuts this underperformance in half.  Once IPO firm returns are matched to size and book-to-
market portfolios, which are themselves free of issuing firms, there is no underperformance.  Average
excess returns are actually positive.  As Brav and Gompers (1997) show, initial public offering firms
have returns that are comparable to similar, nonissuing size and book-to-market firms. 
As we will see later, the reason that matching to size and book-to-market eliminates the
underperformance of the IPO firms but not the SEO firms is that the vast majority of IPO firms are in
the (1,1) portfolio; that is, the smallest, lowest book to market portfolio.  Small, growth firms do
particularly poorly following heavy periods of equity issuances.  SEO firms have a flatter distribution of
size and book-to-market across fractiles, and hence the size and book-to-market benchmark is not
primarily the (1,1) portfolio.
B. Factor regression analysis
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The characteristics-based approach of the previous section assumes that the relevant risk of
firms is captured by some set of observable firm-specific characteristics, e.g., size, book-to-market, and
momentum.  If these observable characteristics are only imperfect proxies for some true underlying
factors, then the characteristics-based approach might misclassify firms’ riskiness.  Fama (1998) argues
that factor-based approaches to performance evaluation as documented in Fama and French (1993) are
more appropriate tests of performance. In the Fama-French (1993) model the first factor is the excess
return on the value weighted market portfolio. The second factor is a factor-mimicking portfolio,
SMB, the return on a zero investment portfolio formed by subtracting the return on a large firm
portfolio from the return on a small firm portfolio.11  Similarly, a second factor mimicking portfolio,
HML, is the return on a zero investment portfolio and is calculated as the return on a portfolio of high
book-to-market stocks less the return on a portfolio of low book-to-market stocks.12  In the tests to
follow, the Fama-French 3-factor model plays a central role.
Carhart (1997) explores extensions of the Fama-French model.  In particular, he argues that a
fourth factor can increase the explanatory power of the Fama-French model when one examines the
returns of mutual funds.  Carhart’s fourth factor is based on ranking firms by their return over the
previous year, i.e., their momentum.  This is based on the empirical observation that firms having high
returns in the previous year tend to continue to enjoy high returns in the next year. We do not take a
position on the distinction between momentum as a contemporaneous factor or as conditioning
                                               
11The breakpoints for small and large are determined by NYSE firms alone, but the portfolios contain
all firms traded on NYSE, ASE, and NASDAQ exchanges. 
12The high book-to-market portfolio represents the top 30% of all firms on COMPUSTAT while the
low book-to-market portfolio contains firms in the lowest 30% of the COMPUSTAT universe of
firms.
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information. His factor, PR12, is formed by taking the return on high momentum stocks minus the
return on low momentum stocks.13
As discussed in Section II, however, Loughran and Ritter (1998) argue that factor models
often suffer from factor contamination and, hence, have low power for determining underperformance.
 Specifically, if factor returns are calculated using, in part, the returns of the sample being tested for
underperformance (e.g., IPOs or SEOs), it is likely that the factor returns will “explain” that
underperformance.  To deal with this potential for factor contamination, we run our factor regressions
using factor returns calculated using all CRSP-listed securities as well as using only those firms which
have not issued equity in an IPO or SEO within the last five years, i.e., issuer-purged factor returns. 
The latter set of factor regressions does not suffer from factor contamination.
  We interpret the intercept in Fama-French three and four-factor model time series regressions
as an indictor of risk-adjusted performance for candidate portfolios.  This measure has a role analogous
to Jensen's alpha in the CAPM framework.  To benchmark the full sample and issuer purged factor
regressions, Table 5 presents four factor regression results for the 25 size and book-to-market
portfolios discussed previously.14  In Panel A, the full sample factors do a reasonable job of pricing
nearly all of the test portfolios.  Much like in the earlier Fama and French (1993) results, the four factor
model has difficulty pricing the (1,1) portfolio, i.e., the smallest, lowest book-to-market firms, which
has a large negative intercept of –0.0053, 53 basis points per month.
                                               
13 Momentum here is defined as the previous 11 month nominal stock return lagged one month. 
We create the factor breakpoints by taking the average return on the top 50% of all firms
(winners) minus the return on the bottom 50% of all firms (losers).
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In Panel B, the purged factor returns appear to price the test portfolios almost as well as the
full sample returns.  While the coefficients do change slightly, there is no dramatic shift in the intercepts
from Panel A.  The purged factors still have difficulty pricing small, growth companies.  The largest
effect of purging the factor returns is on the PR12 coefficients.  It seems that issuing firms contribute
significantly to PR12 returns. Similarly, the adjusted R2s are slightly smaller in all the regressions with
the purged factor returns, although the models continue to explain the vast majority of the time series
of returns.
Table 6 presents the three and four factor regressions for various SEO portfolios using both the
full sample factor returns (Panel A) and the issuer purged factor returns (Panel B).  The results in Panel
A show that both the three and four factor regressions have difficulty pricing the equal-weighted SEO
portfolio returns.  Once returns are value weighted, however, intercepts in three and four factor
regressions become small and we are unable to statistically distinguish them from zero.  If issuers are
broken down by size tercile, only the smallest size tercile displays significant underperformance with an
intercept of –0.0069, 69 basis points per month.  Interestingly, all SEO portfolios load negatively on
PR12, i.e., they covary with low momentum stocks.  This is one reason that matching the buy-and-hold
returns on the basis of momentum in Table 3 did not lower the underperformance.  SEO firms are
actually high momentum stocks prior to issuing.  The average stock return in the year prior to issuance
is 76%.  But in the period immediately following the SEO, their returns look like the returns of low
momentum stocks.  The results in Panel B with the purged factors are qualitatively similar to the full
                                                                                                                                                      
14 These 25 portfolios contain all CRSP-listed firms.
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sample results.  It therefore does not appear that a large portion of the explanatory power of the Fama-
French model comes from factor contamination as Loughran and Ritter (1998) claim.
We present similar results for IPO firms in Table 7.  The results here are even stronger.  In the
three factor regressions, only the equal weighted and smallest tercile returns show any
underperformance.  Intercepts for the value weighted and large portfolios are small and insignificant. 
The four factor results, however, show that even the equal weighted portfolio and the smallest IPO
firm returns can be priced.  Intercepts are insignificant in all of the four factor regressions.
The results of Tables 6 and 7 are not meant to imply that there is no underperformance.  The
interpretation of Fama-French regression results is not without controversy.  What these results do
show, however, is that the returns of SEO and IPO firms have common covariation with other, non-
issuing firms.
C. Repeat Issuers
We next undertake an analysis of the robustness of the performance measurements.  In
particular, we examine whether the first issuance by a firm performs differently from the second or
subsequent equity issuance.  In Table 8 we divide seasoned equity offerings into the first issuance for a
firm during our sample period (including those firms that only do one offering) and second or
subsequent offerings.  While this strategy is contingent upon a starting point in the data, it does not use
future information with respect to portfolio formation.  We expect that if firms are timing the market
when they issue equity, the performance should be similar for first and subsequent offerings.  Under the
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market timing hypothesis, the only firms willing to sell equity are those that are overvalued by the
market.
We find, however, that their performance differs dramatically.  First issuances consistently
perform worse than subsequent offerings.  In three (unreported) and four factor regressions, intercepts
for the sample of first issuances are negative and significant.  For the equal weighted full sample of first
time issuers, the intercept is –0.0033, -33 basis points per month.  The smallest tercile of issuers has an
Second and subsequent issuers, however, never have a statistically significant intercept.  The
equal weighted returns show an insignificant intercept of –0.0012, -12 basis points per month.  Even
the smallest tercile of issuers has an intercept that is insignificantly different from zero (with a t-statistic
of –1.89).   The pervasiveness of SEO underperformance is therefore not universal.  Only the first
equity issuance shows substantial underperformance.  Any explanation of SEO underperformance
needs to account for the differential performance of these two groups.15
D. Calendar time returns
Much of the underperformance literature examines issues in event time, i.e., they treat each
issuance as an independent observation.  We know, however, that issuing firms have many common
characteristics.  Brav (1998) has shown that correcting for cross sectional correlation can substantially
affect the reported significance levels of underperformance.  To illustrate the common co-movements,
we undertake calendar time returns calculations.
                                               
15 The repeat issuer results excluding utilities are qualitatively identical to those reported here.
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In Figure 3, we calculate a time-series regression of its excess return on the Fama and French
factors including Carhart’s momentum factor for each sample firm. We use the version of the factors
that have been purged of issuers.  From each such regression we keep the intercept and residuals. We
calculate size breakpoints (small, medium and large) each month using market capitalizations known at
the beginning of the month and plot the equal weighted cumulative sum of these estimates for the three
size sorts. As the figure shows, the smallest tercile of issuers has consistently negative performance
relative to similar size, book-to-market, and momentum firms that have not issued equity.
The medium and large issuers, however, do not exhibit substantial underperformance over the
entire sample period.  The medium and large firms do, however, substantially decline in value relative
to the benchmarks between 1983 and 1984.  This is the same period that Brav and Gompers (1997)
show that IPO firms also underperformed.  Fama and French (1995) argue that a potentially
unexpected earnings shock affected small, growth companies in the early and mid-1980s.  It is possible
that equity issuers are particularly affected by these low-frequency shocks.
Finally, recall that one of the criticisms that Loughran and Ritter (1998) level against the Fama-
French time-series approach is that the method weights each calendar month equally rather than taking
into account the number of observations in each month. They argue that months where a large number
of SEO firms underperform are not weighted appropriately by the time-series regressions. Since the
cumulative abnormal return described above is an average of individual SEO abnormal returns, their
critique does not apply here. It can be seen that for the large and medium size terciles the exact number
of observations in each month is nearly redundant. Apart from a one-year period of underperformance,
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both graphs are nearly flat, indicating that weighting the calendar months equally does not lead to
reduced power to reject the null hypothesis of no underperformance.
IV. Related Research: What Do We Know?
The empirical finance literature has recently developed a large number of “performance
anomalies” that various authors have suggested are present in financial markets.  Fama (1998) critiques
many of these studies and their methodologies.  Our paper is part of a growing literature [see, for
example, Brav (1998), Mitchell and Stafford (1998), and Eckbo (1998)] that calls into question the
claim that many independent anomalies exist.  In this section, we provide further evidence that the
many of the performance anomalies are actually examining the same return phenomenon.  Second, we
show that the time series of returns on even small seasoned equity offering firms is not unique.
A. Post-listing stock returns
Dharan and Ikenberry (1995) examine the long-run performance of firms following moving
from NASDAQ to either the American Stock Exchange (ASE) or New York Stock Exchange
(NYSE).  They find that performance subsequent to moving exchange listings is particularly bad.  For
all firms moving to a new exchange from 1973 to 1992, the cumulative abnormal return relative to size
and book-to-market benchmarks is –7.02% (t=-2.78). They also examine whether an IPO or SEO
within two years of the listing affects this measured underperformance.  Nonissuers, according to
Dharan and Ikenberry’s definition, performed like issuing firms.
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While we do not replicate all the tests in their paper, we reexamine whether the post-listing
drift is specifically due to an issuer effect.  In Table 9 we examine the three-year cumulative abnormal
returns for firms which move from ASE to the NYSE or from NASDAQ to the NYSE or ASE.  We
use size and book-to-market portfolios as benchmarks to calculate abnormal returns.16  For the entire
sample of firms, the mean cumulative abnormal return over the five years following exchange listing is
–12.1%.  Performance is universally poor regardless of where the firm lists.
We also calculate the abnormal returns of post-listing firms, but exclude all firms that have
done an IPO or SEO within the last five years.  Loughran and Ritter (1995) show that much of the
effect of poor long-run performance after an IPO or SEO occurs in years three through five, post-
issuance.  When the five year cut-off is used (instead of the two year cut-off used by Dharan and
Ikenberry (1995)), 389 firms are dropped from the post-listing sample, i.e., 389 firms move exchanges
within five years of an SEO or an IPO.  Once the five-year cut-off is used, the negative post-listing drift
looks quite meager.  The magnitude of the decline is nearly half of what it was in the entire sample. 
Firms that move from Nasdaq to NYSE now have a positive cumulative abnormal return.  As the six
month period breakdown shows, much of the post-listing drift occurs after eighteen months post-
listing.  Through a year and a half after the move, CARS are –0.85% for all firms that move excluding
issuers and only –2.00% for firms that move from Nasdaq to the ASE.  It is hard to build a reasonable
model in which it takes two years for mispricing to become known.  The post-listing “anomaly” is
therefore probably best understood as another facet of issuer performance.
                                               
16The choice of the long-horizon return interval and the benchmark follows Dharan and
Ikenberry's setup.
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B. Uniqueness of issuer performance
The results above show, along with those in Brav and Gompers (1997), that matching IPOs on
the basis of size and book-to-market benchmarks eliminates their underperformance.  In other words,
IPO firms have returns that mirror similar size and book-to-market firms.  The SEO results, however,
show that size and book-to-market benchmarks do not eliminate underperformance.  Small SEOs
continue to underperform.
The difference between the IPO and SEO results, however, largely stems from the
concentration of IPOs in the (1,1) portfolio, i.e., most IPOs are in the smallest, lowest book-to-market
portfolio which has particularly bad returns after periods of heavy equity issuance.  SEO firms,
however, are more evenly distributed.  It is possible, however, that SEO firms share return patterns
with IPOs and small, low book-to-market nonissuing firms.  This might occur because observable
characteristics are only imperfectly correlated with a firm’s loading on risk factors.
In Table 10, we examine the time series of returns on a zero investment portfolio that invests in
firms which have done a seasoned equity offering within the last five years and shorts firms in the (1,1)
portfolio (excluding IPO and SEO firms).  If the returns of SEOs and (1,1) nonissuing firms are highly
correlated, the intercept in Fama-French factor regressions should be zero and the slope coefficients
should be close to zero.  If the returns of SEOs and small, growth companies are highly correlated,
there ought to be nothing left to explain.  This zero investment portfolio will simply have a return that
is close to white noise.
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The above prediction is born out in the results.  In Table 10, the full sample zero investment
portfolio has a positive intercept in both three and four factor regressions, although they are
insignificant.  Explanatory power of the model is very low, with adjusted R2s of 28%.  When we look
at the smallest tercile of issuers, the group for which we could not explain performance above, the
intercepts are insignificantly different from zero.  Furthermore, slope coefficients are small and the
adjusted R2s are 7% and 13% for the three and four factor model respectively.  This indicates that the
returns of the smallest SEO firms are highly correlated with the returns of (1,1) firms that have not
issued equity.17
Section III results indicated that the smallest SEO returns were difficult to explain.  Table 10,
however, shows that even the performance of the smallest SEOs is not unique.  The time series of their
returns is highly correlated with the return of small, growth companies (which have not issued equity)
even though the SEO firms are not in the (1,1) portfolio.  These results also highlight some of the
potential pitfalls of characteristic-based approaches to performance evaluation.  If the characteristic is
not perfectly correlated with the factor loading or source of performance premium (or discount),
characteristic-based performance tests can lead to erroneous results.
V. Conclusions
The results from this paper shed light on previous studies that have documented
underperformance of firms issuing equity.  We have shown that IPO firm returns are similar to size and
                                               
17 The simple correlation between the monthly excess return (over the market) of 1,1 portfolio
and the smallest SEO tercile is 0.867 (p=0.000), between the 1,1 and the middle tercile is 0.625
(p=0.000), and between the 1,1 and the largest tercile of SEOs is 0.101 (p=0.129).
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book-to-market firms that have not issued equity.  Value weighted portfolios of SEO firms show small
economic underperformance.  Our results are robust to purging the benchmarks and factor returns of
issuers.
Recent papers by Teoh, Welch, and Wong (1998a,b) and Lee (1997) indicate that various
attributes of the IPO or SEO can predict which issuers will underperform.  Teoh et al. (1998a,b) find
that a higher level of discretionary accruals prior to issuance, potentially to boost earnings, is associated
with poorer post-issue performance.  Lee (1997) shows that SEOs in which managers do not sell
equity, i.e., primary issues, perform worse than SEOs in which managers sell some of their equity
holdings.  Our results are consistent with their findings.  Firms with higher levels of discretionary
accruals and issue primary shares tend to be the smaller IPO and SEO firms, so it is not unsurprising
that their measures are correlated with relative performance.
Our results also support the notion that many of the long-run anomalies found in the finance
literature are manifestations of the same returns’ pattern in the data.  Various types of corporate
decisions or subsamples of firms may be more heavily weighted in the types of firms that underperform
without the decision or event being the cause of underperformance.  If one separates a sample into
various groups, one part of the sample is very likely to underperform.  In fact, we have shown that the
post-listing result of Dharan and Ikenberry (1995) is largely caused by issuing firms in their sample. 
We have also shown that the time series of issuing firm returns, both IPO and SEO firms, are similar to
those of small, growth firms which have not issued equity.  In other words, equity issuers’ return
patterns are not unique.  They are part of more systematic price movements.
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Financial economists interested in examining long-run performance should retain factor models
as an evaluative tool.  Loughran and Ritter’s (1998) critiques of factor models clearly need to be
considered when evaluating performance.  We have shown, however, that characteristic-based
approaches can suffer from various pitfalls as well.  Without a clear theory to guide the choice of
portfolio formation rules or proper risk-adjustment, a thorough study of performance must employ
both approaches.
Our results are consistent with both behavioral finance and equilibrium rational asset pricing
interpretations.  Like Fama (1998), our results may simply imply that we do not yet have the correct
model of returns.  The ability to narrow the underperformance or explain it with various factor models
is evidence in that direction.  A behavioral explanation would suggest that investor sentiment is a wider
phenomenon, affecting a large number of firms in the market simultaneously.  While we do not offer
such a “unified theory” of behavioral finance, we believe our results point to the need for such a theory.
 Papers like Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam (1998) and Barberis, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998)
seem ad hoc in their approach to behavioral modeling.  The sentiment in their models is firm-specific. 
Behavioral models should be more general and generate testable empirical predictions, much like
equilibrium asset pricing models.
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Figure 1  Time Series of Seasoned Equity Offerings Listed by Exchange at Time of Offering.  The sample of
seasoned equity offerings was identified in the Investment Dealers' Digest of Corporate Financing for the period 1975-
1992.  Jay Ritter provided data on seasoned equity offerings for the period 1975-1984.  For inclusion in our sample, a firm
performing a seasoned equity offering must be followed by CRSP sometime after the offering date.  The sample includes
4,526 offerings made by 2,772 firms.  Offerings are listed by the exchange on which the firm was trading at the time of
the offering.
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Figure 2  Time Series of Initial Public Offerings. The sample of initial public offerings is collected from various
issues of the Investment Dealers' Digest of Corporate Financing for the period 1975-1995 as well as from the
Securities Data Corporation database.  For inclusion in the sample, a firm performing an IPO must be followed by
the Center for Research in Securities Prices (CRSP) at some point after the offering date.  The final sample
includes 4,622 IPOs for the period 1975-1992.
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Figure 3  Calendar-time cumulative abnormal returns by size of SEO issuer.  The sample is 4,526 seasoned equity
offering (SEO) firms that issued equity between 1976 and 1992.  For each firm in the sample we calculate a time-series
regression of its excess return on the Fama and French three factors including a momentum factor where all factors have
been purged of issuing firms. From each such regression we keep the intercept and residuals.  We calculate size
breakpoints each month using market capitalization at the beginning of the month and plot the equal weighted cumulative
sum of these estimates for three size sorts. 
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Table 1
The distribution of IPOs by book-to-market and size.  The sample is all IPOs from 1975 through 1992.  Size
breakpoints are formed quarterly by dividing all NYSE stocks into size quintiles. Book-to-market breakpoints are formed
quarterly with equal numbers of NYSE firms allocated to each of five book-to-market portfolios. The intersection of these
quintile breakpoints results in 25 possible allocations.
Size Quintile
Book-to-Market
Quintiles
Smallest Quintile 2 Quintile 3 Quintile 4 Largest Total
Low 51.80% 18.20% 5.50% 1.70% 0.40% 77.60%
2 8.20% 1.90% 0.90% 0.20% 0.10% 11.50%
3 3.00% 1.20% 0.60% 0.10% 0.10% 4.90%
4 1.60% 0.60% 0.30% 0.10% 0.00% 2.60%
High 2.00% 0.80% 0.40% 0.20% 0.00% 3.40%
Total 66.60% 22.70% 7.70% 2.30% 0.60% 100.00%
Table 2
The distribution of SEOs by book-to-market and size.  The sample is all SEOs from 1975 through 1992.  Size
breakpoints are formed quarterly by dividing all NYSE stocks into size quintiles. Book-to-market breakpoints are formed
quarterly with equal numbers of NYSE firms allocated to each of five book-to-market portfolios. The intersection of these
quintile breakpoints results in 25 possible allocations.
Size Quintile
Book-to-Market
Quintiles
Smallest Quintile 2 Quintile 3 Quintile 4 Largest Total
Low 24.10% 12.60% 7.30% 4.20% 2.40% 50.70%
2 7.40% 5.10% 3.30% 1.70% 1.30% 18.70%
3 4.10% 3.20% 2.20% 2.30% 1.50% 13.20%
4 2.70% 2.00% 1.90% 1.80% 1.20% 9.70%
High 2.20% 1.50% 1.30% 1.40% 1.40% 7.80%
Total 40.50% 24.50% 16.00% 11.30% 7.80% 100.00%
Table 3
The long-run performance of seasoned equity offerings.  The sample is 4,526 seasoned equity offerings from
1975 through 1992.  Five year equal weighted and value weighted buy and hold returns on SEOs are compared
with alternative benchmarks. In the first four rows we employ the S&P 500, NASDAQ Composite, and NYSE-
ASE-NASDAQ equal and value weight indices. Value weight results for these indices employ 4,512 observations
because market capitalization in the month after the SEO for 14 firms could not be found.  Value weight results are
adjusted for inflation. Rows five through seven present abnormal performance measured relative to attribute-based
portfolios. Size and book-to market portfolios are generated by first forming size quintile breakpoints using NYSE
firms only. These quintiles are split further into book-to-market quintiles using NYSE breakpoints only. The
universe of NYSE, ASE and NASDAQ firms are allocated into the resulting 25 portfolios and equal weighted
monthly returns are calculated. The breakpoints for these portfolios are recalculated quarterly. Size, book-to-
market and momentum portfolios are formed as follows. We first form size quartile breakpoints using NYSE firms
only and then, within each size quartile, form book-to-market quartile breakpoints using NYSE firms only. We
allocate the universe of NYSE, ASE, and NASDAQ firms into these 16 portfolios and then within each portfolio
form additional quartile breakpoints based on prior year returns excluding the previous month. We calculate the
resulting portfolio average returns for these 64 portfolios. This portfolio formation is repeated monthly. In the first
six rows we report buy and hold results while in the seventh row we report event-time rebalanced results. Buy and
hold returns are generated by compounding 60 monthly returns starting in the month following the equity issue.  If
the SEO delists before the 60th month we compound the return up until the delisting month.  Event-time
rebalancing results are generated by compounding event-time monthly averages for the SEOs and their benchmark.
Since some firms lack the accounting information necessary for the attribute matching we report results for 3,775
firms in rows five and six and for 4,091 in row seven. Abnormal return is the simple difference between SEO five-
year average return and the corresponding benchmark. Wealth relatives are calculated as Σ(1+Ri,T)/Σ(1+Rbench,T),
where Ri,T
 is the holding period return on the SEO i for period T and Rbench,T is the return on the benchmark
portfolio over the same period.  All returns on the SEOs and benchmark portfolios are taken from the CRSP files.
Panel A: Buy-and-Hold Returns
Equal Weighted Buy-and-Hold Returns (%) Value Weighted Buy-and-Hold Returns (%)
Benchmarks SEO Bench-
mark
Abnormal
Return
Wealth
Relative
SEO Bench-
mark
Abnormal
Return
Wealth
Relative
S&P 500 index 57.5 87.6 -30.1 0.84 75.3 94.3 -19.0 0.90
NASDAQ Comp. 57.5 76.9 -19.5 0.89 75.3 89.5 -14.2 0.93
CRSP VW 57.5 81.5 -24.0 0.87 75.3 89.5 -14.1 0.93
CRSP EW 57.5 81.6 -24.2 0.87 75.3 102.2 -26.9 0.87
Size and Book-to-
Market (3,775 obs)
57.6 83.9 -26.3 0.86 72.5 97.5 -25.0 0.87
Size and Book-to-
Market and PR12
(3,775 obs)
57.0 84.3 -27.3 0.85 75.7 99.5 -23.8 0.88
Size and Book-to-
Market and PR12
rebalanced (4,091 obs)
55.0 85.2 -30.2 0.84 75.2 97.7 -22.5 0.89
Table 3 (continued)
The long-run performance of seasoned equity offerings. The sample is 4,526 seasoned equity offerings from
1975 through 1992.  Five year equal weighted and value weighted buy and hold returns on SEOs are compared
with alternative benchmarks. In the first four rows we employ the S&P 500, NASDAQ Composite, and NYSE-
ASE-NASDAQ equal and value weight indices. Value weight results for these indices employ 4,512 observations
because market capitalization in the month after the SEO for 14 firms could not be found.  Value weight results are
adjusted for inflation. Rows five through seven present abnormal performance measured relative to attribute-based
portfolios. Size and book-to market portfolios are generated by first forming size quintile breakpoints using NYSE
firms only. These quintiles are split further into book-to-market quintiles using NYSE breakpoints only. The
universe of NYSE, ASE and NASDAQ firms are allocated into the resulting 25 portfolios and equal weighted
monthly returns are calculated. The breakpoints for these portfolios are recalculated quarterly. Size, book-to-
market and momentum portfolios are formed as follows. We first form size quartile breakpoints using NYSE firms
only and then, within each size quartile, form book-to-market quartile breakpoints using NYSE firms only. We
allocate the universe of NYSE, ASE, and NASDAQ firms into these 16 portfolios and then within each portfolio
form additional quartile breakpoints based on prior year returns excluding the previous month. We calculate the
resulting portfolio average returns for these 64 portfolios. This portfolio formation is repeated monthly. In the first
six rows we report buy and hold results while in the seventh row we report event-time rebalanced results.
Cumulative abnormal returns are generated by summing 60 monthly abnormal returns starting in the month
following the equity issue.  If the SEO delists before the 60th month we sum the return up until the delisting
month.  Event-time rebalancing results are generated by summing event-time monthly averages for the SEOs and
their benchmark. Since some firms lack the accounting information necessary for the attribute matching we report
results for 3,775 firms in rows five and six and for 4,091 in row seven. All returns on the SEOs and benchmark
portfolios are taken from the CRSP files.
Panel B: Cumulative Abnormal Returns
Equal Weighted CARs (%) Value Weighted CARs (%)
Benchmarks SEO Bench-
mark
CAR SEO Bench-mark CAR
S&P 500 index 51.5 75.5 -24.0 60.4 70.2 -9.8
NASDAQ Composite 51.5 70.7 -19.2 60.4 69.2 -8.8
CRSP Value-Weighted 51.5 72.0 -20.5 60.4 68.1 -7.8
CRSP Equal-Weighted 51.5 68.7 -17.15 60.4 70.4 -10.1
Size and Book-to-Market (3,775 obs) 53.2 68.6 -15.4 56.0 71.9 -15.9
Size and Book-to-Market and PR12 (3,775
obs)
52.4 67.7 -15.3 56.6 73.8 -17.1
Size and Book-to-Market and PR12
rebalanced (4,091 obs)
52.8 73.1 -20.3 56.5 71.6 -15.1
Table 4
The long-run performance of initial public offerings.  The sample is 4,622 initial public offerings from 1975
through 1992. Five year equal weighted and value weighted buy and hold returns on IPOs are compared with
alternative benchmarks. In the first four rows we employ the S&P 500, NASDAQ Composite, and NYSE-ASE-
NASDAQ equal and value weight indices. Throughout, value weight results are adjusted for inflation. In row five
we present abnormal performance measured relative to size and book-to market portfolios. These portfolios are
generated by first forming size quintile breakpoints using NYSE firms only. These quintiles are split further into
book-to-market quintiles using NYSE breakpoints only. The universe of NYSE, ASE and NASDAQ firms are
allocated into the resulting 25 portfolios and we calculate equal weighted monthly returns. The breakpoints for
these portfolios are recalculated quarterly. Buy and hold returns are generated by compounding 60 monthly returns
starting in the month following the equity issue. Since some firms lack the accounting information necessary for
the attribute matching we report results for 3,501 in row five. If the IPO delists before the 60th month we
compound the return up until the delisting month. Abnormal return is the simple difference between IPO five-year
average return and the corresponding benchmark. Wealth relatives are calculated as Σ(1+Ri,T)/Σ(1+Rbench,T), where
Ri,T
 is the holding period return on the IPO i for period T and Rbench,T is the return on the benchmark portfolio over
the same period.  All returns on the IPOs and benchmark portfolios are taken from the CRSP files.
Panel A: Buy-and-Hold Returns
Equal Weighted Buy-and-Hold Returns (%) Value Weighted Buy-and-Hold Returns (%)
Benchmarks IPO Bench-
mark
Abnormal
Return
Wealth
Relative
IPO Bench-
mark
Abnormal
Return
Wealth
Relative
S&P 500 index 33.1 77.3 -44.2 0.75 52.6 78.3 -25.7 0.86
NASDAQ Composite 33.1 64.2 -31.1 0.81 52.6 68.2 -15.6 0.91
CRSP VW 33.1 71.7 -38.6 0.78 52.6 72.4 -19.8 0.89
CRSP EW 33.1 61.5 -28.4 0.82 52.6 61.4 -8.8 0.95
Size and Book-to-
Market (3,501 Obs)
35.8 29.2 6.6 1.05 56.6 55.2 1.4 1.01
Table 4 (continued)
The long-run performance of initial public offerings.  The sample is 4,622 initial public offerings from 1975
through 1992. Five year equal weighted and value weighted cumulative abnormal returns on IPOs are compared
with alternative benchmarks. In the first four rows we employ the S&P 500, NASDAQ Composite and NYSE-
ASE-NASDAQ equal and value weight indices. Throughout, value weight results are adjusted for inflation. In row
five we present abnormal performance measured relative to size and book-to market portfolios. These portfolios are
generated by first forming size quintile breakpoints using NYSE firms only. These quintiles are split further into
book-to-market quintiles using NYSE breakpoints only. The universe of NYSE, ASE and NASDAQ firms are
allocated into the resulting 25 portfolios and we calculate equal weighted monthly returns. The breakpoints for
these portfolios are recalculated quarterly. Since some firms lack the accounting information necessary for the
attribute matching we report results for 3,501 in row five. Cumulative abnormal returns are generated by summing
60 monthly abnormal returns starting in the month following the equity issue.  If the IPO delists before the 60th
month we sum up until the delisting month.  All returns on the IPOs and benchmark portfolios are taken from the
CRSP files.
Panel B: Cumulative Abnormal Returns
Equal Weighted CARs (%) Value Weighted CARs (%)
Benchmarks IPO Bench-mark CAR IPO Bench-mark CAR
S&P 500 index 35.9 74.2 -38.3 40.7 61.5 -20.8
NASDAQ Composite 35.9 67.9 -32.0 40.7 57.5 -16.8
CRSP Value-Weighted 35.9 70.2 -34.3 40.7 58.1 -17.4
CRSP Equal-Weighted 35.9 62.4 -26.5 40.7 51.8 -11.1
Size and Book-to-Market (3501 Obs) 42.3 32.6 9.7 53.0 49.7 3.3
Table 5
Four factor regressions for twenty-five test portfolios formed on the basis of size and book-to-market.  Panel A presents factor regressions for the 25
benchmark portfolios using factors formed from all CRSP-listed firms.  Panel B forms the factors excluding all issuing firms, i.e., excluding all firms that issued
equity in an initial public offering or seasoned equity offering during the previous five years. RMRF is the return on portfolio formed by subtracting the value
weighted market return on all NYSE/ASE/NASDAQ firms (RM) minus the risk free rate (RF) which is the one-month Treasury bill rate.  SMB (small
minus big) is the difference each month between the return on small firms and big firms.  HML (high minus low) is the difference each month between
the return on a portfolio of high book-to-market stocks and the return on a portfolio of low book-to-market stocks. PR12 is the excess return on
winners versus losers based on prior year returns excluding the previous month. [t-statistics are in brackets.]
Panel A: Full Sample Factors
Intercept Small 2 3 4 Large
Low -0.0053 [4.16] -0.0016 [-1.90] -0.0004 [-0.45] 0.0013 [1.57] 0.0013 [1.52]
2 0.0012 [1.33] 0.0002 [0.21] 0.0007 [0.90] -0.0004 [-0.54] 0.0009 [1.01]
3 0.0001 [0.09] 0.0012 [1.64] 0.0000 [0.02] -0.0005 [-0.59] -0.0005 [-0.45]
4 0.0016 [2.17] 0.0016 [2.07] 0.0013 [1.62] 0.0000 [0.02] -0.0003 [-0.31]
High 0.0003 [0.41] -0.001 [–1.20] -0.0006 [-0.57] 0.0004 [0.33] -0.0007 [-0.51]
RMRF Small 2 3 4 Large
Low 1.0498 [34.87] 1.1060 [57.12] 1.0785 [54.22] 1.0464 [52.99] 0.9518 [46.36]
2 1.0171 [48.70] 1.0506 [55.73] 1.0286 [52.57] 1.0909 [55.84] 1.0501 [49.48]
3 0.9599 [58.57] 0.9981 [57.94]] 0.9657 51.82] 1.0948 [49.82] 0.9790 [40.79]
4 0.9056 [52.80] 0.9779 [54.41] 0.9777 [50.35] 1.0528 [44.48] 1.0172 [47.02]
High 0.9925 [52.60] 1.1008 [57.18] 1.1037 [45.03] 1.1686 [41.20] 1.0349 [31.38]
SMB Small 2 3 4 Large
Low 1.3100 [27.10] 1.0104 [32.50] 0.7222 [22.62] 0.3533 [11.15] -0.1966 [-5.96]
2 1.1893 [35.47] 0.9297 [30.71] 0.6557 [20.87] 0.3191 [10.17] -0.1690 [-4.96]
3 1.0774 [40.95] 0.8378 [30.29] 0.6076 [20.30] 0.3343 [9.48] -0.2357 [-6.12]
4 1.0693 [38.83] 0.7561 26.20] 0.4651 [14.91] 0.1508 [3.97] -0.1657 [-4.77]
High 1.1794 [38.93] 0.9220 [29.83] 0.6224 [15.82] 0.2816 [6.18] -0.0995 [-1.88]
HML Low 2 3 4 High
Low -0.2800 [-5.46] -0.5064 [-15.34] -0.4221 [-12.45] -0.4393 [-13.05] -0.4317 [-12.33]
2 0.0324 [0.91] -0.018 [-0.56] 0.0418 [1.25] -0.0075 [-0.23] -0.0793 [-2.19]
3 0.2237 [8.00] 0.2179 [7.42] 0.3069 [9.66] 0.2895 [7.73] 0.1444 [3.53]
4 0.3607 [12.33] 0.4337 [14.15] 0.4214 [12.73] 0.5133 [12.72] 0.482 [13.07]
High 0.6500 [20.21] 0.6813 [20.76] 0.7622 [18.24] 0.7129 [14.74] 0.8193 [14.57]
PR12 Small 2 3 4 Large
Low -0.0814 [-1.97] -0.0033 [-0.13] 0.0382 [1.40] -0.0045 [-0.17] -0.0749 [-2.66]
2 -0.1465 [-5.12] 0.0124 [0.48] 0.0249 [0.93] -0.0384 [-1.43] 0.0078 [0.27]
3 -0.046 [-2.05] 0.0213 [0.90] 0.0420 [1.65] -0.0350 [-1.16] 0.0774 [2.35]
4 -0.0673 [-2.86] 0.0494 [2.00] -0.0337 [-1.27] -0.0667 [-2.06] -0.075 –2.53]
High -0.0574 [-2.22] 0.0273 [1.04] 0.1213 [3.61] 0.0205 [0.53] -0.0426 [-0.94]
Adjusted R2 Small 2 3 4 Large
Low 92.70 96.83 95.96 95.16 92.78
2 95.61 96.04 94.82 94.58 92.39
3 96.68 95.97 94.25 92.72 88.22
4 96.00 95.07 93.24 89.98 90.03
High 95.92 95.63 91.92 88.87 80.36
Table 5 (continued)
Panel B:  Purged Factor Regressions
Intercept Small 2 3 4 Large
Low -0.0060 [-4.26] -0.0015 [-1.39] 0.0001 [0.06] 0.0013 [1.45] 0.0015 [1.78]
2 0.0004 [0.44] 0.0005 [0.60] 0.0011 [1.30] -0.0007 [-0.86] 0.0007 [0.83]
3 -0.0001 [-0.06] 0.0016 [2.08] 0.0003 [0.42] -0.0004 [-0.47] -0.0008 [-0.78]
4 0.0015 [1.80] 0.0018 [2.28] 0.0013 [1.53] -0.0002 [-0.23\ -0.0009 [-0.95]
High 0.0000 [0.00] -0.0005 [-0.53] -0.0001 [-0.06] 0.0005 [0.39] -0.0009 [-0.58]
RMRF Small 2 3 4 Large
Low 1.1018 [33.34] 1.1685 [47.35] 1.1248 [50.48] 1.0804 [50.56] 0.9489 [47.33]
2 1.0483 [43.84] 1.0819 [53.19] 1.0524 [52.01] 1.1042 [58.16] 1.0497 [50.10]
3 0.9798 [51.58] 1.0192 [56.59] 0.9773 [50.72] 1.0978 [51.14] 0.9744 [41.93]
4 0.9097 [45.70] 0.9909 [53.37] 0.9793 [50.87] 1.0441 [47.00] 0.9989 [47.17]
High 0.9903 [42.58] 1.0928 [45.79] 1.0883 [39.47] 1.1468 [37.65] 0.9834 [27.12]
SMB Small 2 3 4 Large
Low 1.2635 [23.80] 0.9235 [23.29] 0.6543 [18.27] 0.3097 [9.02] -0.2019 [-6.27]
2 1.1869 [30.89] 0.8928 [27.31] 0.6241 [19.19] 0.3252 [10.66] -0.1590 [-4.72]
3 1.0759 [35.25] 0.8252 [28.51] 0.6020 [19.44] 0.3421 [9.92] -0.2152 [-5.76]
4 1.0948 [34.23] 0.7648 [25.63] 0.4911 [15.88] 0.2020 [5.66] -0.1223 [-3.59]
High 1.2296 [38.90] 0.9500 [24.78] 0.6599 [14.88] 0.3183 [6.50] -0.0097 [-0.17]
HML Low 2 3 4 High
Low -0.3701 [[-5.62] -0.5854 [-11.90] -0.5037 [-11.34] -0.4644 [-10.90] -0.4791 [-11.99]
2 -0.0462[-0.97] -0.1227 [-3.03] -0.0247 [-0.61] -0.0066 [-0.17] -0.0468 [-1.12]
3 0.1196 [3.16] 0.1351 [3.76] 0.2545 [6.63] 0.2769 [6.47] 0.2166 [4.67]
4 0.2235 [5.63] 0.3847 [10.39] 0.4118 [10.73] 0.5625 [12.70] 0.5686 [13.47]
High 0.5331 [11.50] 0.5517 [11.60] 0.6734 [12.25] 0.6878 [11.33] 0.8093 [11.20]
PR12 Small 2 3 4 Large
Low -0.0044 [-0.06] -0.0894 [-1.55] -0.0643 [-1.23] -0.0798 [-1.60] -0.2185 [-4.66]
2 -0.1232 [-2.20] -0.0329 [-0.69] -0.0240 [-0.51] -0.0552 [-1.24] 0.0230 [0.47]
3 -0.0073 [-0.16] -0.0254 [-0.60] 0.0458 [1.01] -0.0948 [-1.89] 0.2126 [3.91]
4 -0.0240 [-0.52] 0.0792 [1.82] -0.0410 [-0.91] -0.1063 [-2.04] -0.0286 [-0.58]
High 0.0843 [1.55] 0.1024 [1.83] 0.2756 [4.27] 0.1244 [1.75] 0.0911 [1.07]
Adjusted R2 Small 2 3 4 Large
Low 90.73 94.58 94.65 94.03 92.74
2 93.94 95.14 94.16 94.60 92.19
3 95.30 95.36 93.51 92.68 88.36
4 94.33 94.46 93.00 90.70 89.93
High 93.46 92.92 89.20 86.47 74.97
Table 6
Fama-French (1993) time-series regressions on SEO rolling portfolios for the whole sample and sorted on the basis of size.  The sample of
SEOs is all firms that issued equity between 1975 and 1992.  Portfolios of SEOs are formed by including all issues that were done within the previous
five years.  RMRF is the return on portfolio formed by subtracting the value weighted market return on all NYSE/ASE/NASDAQ firms (RM) minus
the risk free rate (RF) which is the one-month Treasury bill rate.  SMB (small minus big) is the difference each month between the return on small
firms and big firms.  HML (high minus low) is the difference each month between the return on a portfolio of high book-to-market stocks and the
return on a portfolio of low book-to-market stocks. PR12 is the excess return on winners versus losers based on prior year returns excluding the
previous month.    The first five columns presents results using the Fama and French three factor model. The next five columns add Carhart's
momentum factor to the Fama and French three factors. Within each set of regressions we report equal and value weight results for the entire sample as
well as equal weight results for three size sorts.  [t-statistics are in brackets.]
Panel A:  SEOs – Fama-French and Carhart's Factors / Size Terciles
Full Sample Size Terciles Full Sample Size Terciles
Equal
Weighted
Value
Weighted
Small Medium Large Equal
Weighted
Value
Weighted
Small Medium Large
Intercepts -0.0037
[-4.81]
-0.0014
[-1.36]
-0.0069
[-4.32]
-0.0026
[-3.16]
-0.0016
[-1.77]
-0.0019  
[-2.56]
-0.0006
[-0.53]
-0.0026
[-1.81]
-0.0021
[-2.42]
-0.0008
[-0.85]
RMRF 1.0491
[53.72]
0.9238
[36.10]
1.0693
[26.60]
1.0697
[50.76]
1.0082
[42.72]
1.0722
[60.87]
0.9340
[36.42]
1.1219
[31.90]
1.0762
[50.73]
1.0184
[43.16]
SMB 0.7668
[25.09]
0.0328
[0.82]
1.2771
[20.30]
0.8292
[25.14]
0.1950
[5.28]
0.7364
[26.81]
0.0194
[0.49]
1.2078
[22.02]
0.8207
[24.81]
0.1816
[4.94]
HML -0.1021
[-3.17]
-0.0264
[-0.63]
0.0887
[1.34]
-0.2547
[-7.34]
-0.1408
[-3.62]
-0.1507
[-5.15]
-0.0478
[-1.12]
-0.0218
[-0.37]
-0.2683
[-7.61]
-0.1623
[-4.14]
PR12 -0.1984
[-7.94]
-0.0874
[-2.40]
-0.4518
[-9.05]
-0.0557
[-1.85]
-0.0876
[-2.61]
Adjusted R2 0.9569 0.8765 0.8695 0.9558 0.9176 0.9657 0.8789 0.9024 0.9562 0.9195
Panel B:  SEOs – Issuer Purged Factors / Size Terciles
Full Sample Size Terciles Full Sample Size Terciles
Equal
Weighted
Value
Weighted
Small Medium Large Equal
Weighted
Value
Weighted
Small Medium Large
Intercepts -0.0040
[-4.65]
-0.0017
[-1.63]
-0.0069
[-4.17]
-0.0030
[-3.01]
-0.0020
[-2.14]
-0.0028
[-3.34]
-0.0007
[-0.65]
-0.0050
[-3.04]
-0.0023
[-2.30]
-0.0010
[-1.04]
RMRF 1.0900
[50.39]
0.9345
[36.74]
1.1157
[26.68]
1.1205
[44.61]
1.0336
[42.95]
1.0971
[54.03]
0.9402
[38.0141
]
1.1269
[28.07]
1.1244
[45.30]
1.0398
[44.83]
SMB 0.7355
[20.42]
0.0514
[1.27]
1.2557
[18.92]
0.7667
[19.23]
0.1848
[4.84]
0.7355
[22.86]
0.0515
[1.31]
1.2558
[19.74]
0.7667
[19.50]
0.1849
[5.03]
HML -0.1183
[-2.83]
0.0171
[0.35]
-0.0064
[-0.08]
-0.2693
[-5.54]
-0.0925
[-1.99]
-0.1742
[-4.31]
-0.0283
[-0.58]
-0.0820
[-1.03]
-0.3000
[-6.07]
-0.1411
[-3.06]
PR12 -0.2745
[-5.76]
-0.2227
[-3.84]
-0.4339
[-4.61]
-0.1506
[-2.59]
-0.2386
[-4.39]
Adjusted R2 0.9466 0.8768 0.8574 0.9366 0.9135 0.9529 0.8835 0.8685 0.9381 0.9196
Table 7
Fama-French (1993) time-series regressions on IPO rolling portfolios for the whole sample and sorted on the basis of size.  The sample is all
IPOs that issued equity between 1975 and 1992.  Portfolios of IPOs are formed by including all issues that were done within the previous five years. 
RMRF is the return on portfolio formed by subtracting the value weighted market return on all NYSE/ASE/NASDAQ firms (RM) minus the risk free
rate (RF) which is the one-month Treasury bill rate.  SMB (small minus big) is the difference each month between the return on small firms and big
firms.  HML (high minus low) is the difference each month between the return on a portfolio of high book-to-market stocks and the return on a
portfolio of low book-to-market stocks.  PR12 is the excess return on winners versus losers based on prior year returns excluding the previous month.
The first five columns presents results using the Fama and French three factor model. The next five columns add Carhart's momentum factor to the
Fama and French three factors. Within each set of regressions we report equal and value weight results for the entire sample as well as equal weight
results for three size sorts.   [t-statistics are in brackets.]
Panel A: IPOs – Fama-French and Carhart's Factors / Size Terciles
Full Sample Size Terciles Full Sample Size Terciles
Equal
Weighted
Value
Weighted
Small Medium Large Equal
Weighted
Value
Weighted
Small Medium Large
Intercepts -0.0031
[-1.94]
-0.0011
[-0.66]
-0.0065
[-2.29]
-0.0021
[-1.15]
-0.0006
[-0.39]
-0.0009
[-0.57]
-0.0015
[-0.87]
-0.0011
[-0.39]
-0.0006
[-0.33]
-0.0010
[-0.60]
RMRF 0.9798
[24.39]
1.0684
[25.62]
0.8385
[11.73]
1.0005
[21.31]
1.1013
[28.06]
1.0067
[25.58]
1.0633
[25.17]
0.9055
[13.40]
1.0189
[21.65]
1.0966
[27.58]
SMB 1.2214
[19.42]
0.8459
[12.96]
1.4267
[12.75]
1.2729
[17.32]
0.9640
[15.69]
1.1860
[19.33]
0.8527
[12.95]
1.3384
[12.71]
1.2486
[17.02]
0.9702
[15.65]
HML -0.2568
[-3.88]
-0.5808
[-8.45]
0.0784
[0.67]
-0.2795
[-3.61]
-0.5637
[-8.72]
-0.3134
[-4.79]
-0.570
[-8.12]
-0.0624
[-0.56]
-0.3183
[-4.07]
-0.5539
[-8.38]
PR12 -0.2310
[-4.13]
0.0443
[0.74]
-0.5752
[-6.00]
-0.1584
[-2.37]
0.0403
[0.71]
Adjusted R2 0.8668 0.8657 0.6359 0.8353 0.8879 0.8752 0.8654 0.6822 0.8384 0.8876
Panel B: IPOs – Issuer Purged Factors / Size Terciles
Full Sample Size Terciles Full Sample Size Terciles
Equal
Weighted
Value
Weighted
Small Medium Large Equal
Weighted
Value
Weighted
Small Medium Large
Intercepts -0.0030
[-1.79]
-0.0017
[-0.91]
-0.0059
[-2.05]
-0.0019
[-1.01]
-0.0011
[-0.61]
-0.0023
[-1.35]
-0.0019
[-1.03]
-0.0041
[-1.41]
-0.0016
[-0.79]
-0.0012
[-0.69]
RMRF 1.0174
[24.13]
1.1295
[24.75]
0.8530
[11.86]
1.0360
[21.33]
1.1633
[26.59]
1.0212
[24.29]
1.1279
[24.69]
0.8631
[12.11]
1.0381
[21.36]
1.1624
[26.53]
SMB 1.1548
[17.25]
0.7498
[10.35]
1.4044
[12.30]
1.2023
[15.59]
0.8579
[12.35]
1.1548
[17.33]
0.7498
[10.36]
1.4045
[12.44]
1.2023
[15.61]
0.8578
[12.35]
HML -0.4175
[-5.12]
-0.6010
[-6.81]
-0.1767
[-1.27]
-0.4648
[-4.95]
-0.6082
[-7.18]
-0.4472
[-5.35]
-0.5879
[-6.47]
-0.2564
[-1.81]
-0.4818
[-4.98]
-0.6006
[-6.89]
PR12 -0.1456
[-1.48]
0.0642
[0.60]
-0.3911
[-2.34]
-0.0836
[-0.73]
0.0373
[0.36]
Adjusted R2 0.8519 0.8377 0.6276 0.8220 0.8594 0.8526 0.8372 0.6344 0.8216 0.8588
Table 8
Fama-French (1993) three factor regressions on SEO rolling portfolios for the whole sample and sorted on the basis of size for various
issuances.  The sample is all SEOs from 1975 through 1992.  Portfolios of SEOs are formed by including all issues that were done within the previous
five years.  RMRF is the return on portfolio formed by subtracting the value weighted market return on all NYSE/ASE/NASDAQ firms (RM) minus
the risk free rate (RF) which is the one-month Treasury bill rate.  SMB (small minus big) is the difference each month between the return on small
firms and big firms.  HML (high minus low) is the difference each month between the return on a portfolio of high book-to-market stocks and the
return on a portfolio of low book-to-market stocks.  PR12 is the excess return on winners versus losers based on prior year returns excluding the
previous month. The first five columns presents results using the Fama and French three factor model and Carhart's momentum to price firms
conducting their first SEO in the sample period while the next five columns use the four factor model to price second or subsequent issuers. Within
each set of regressions we report equal and value weight results for the entire sample as well as equal weight results for three size sorts. [t-statistics are
in brackets.]
First Issuance Second or Subsequent Issuance
Full Sample Size Terciles Full Sample Size Terciles
Equal
Weighted
Value
Weighted
Small Medium Large Equal
Weighted
Value
Weighted
Small Medium Large
Intercepts
-0.0033
[-3.37]
-0.0012
[-1.34]
-0.0052
[-2.69]
-0.0036
[-3.01]
-0.0010
[-1.12]
-0.0012
[-1.06]
0.0002
[0.17]
-0.0030
[-1.89]
-0.0008
[-0.56]
0.0000
[-0.03]
RMRF
1.1239
[47.47]
1.0207
[45.03]
1.1232
[23.77]
1.1458
[39.58]
1.1030
[48.31]
1.0075
[35.72]
0.8787
[25.30]
1.0829
[27.57]
1.0166
[29.16]
0.9401
[26.42]
SMB
0.8623
[22.99]
0.1020
[2.84]
1.3232
[17.68]
0.9204
[20.06]
0.3448
[9.53]
0.4269
[9.55]
-0.0203
[-0.37]
0.9005
[14.47]
0.3670
[6.65]
0.0203
[-0.36]
HML
-0.243
[-5.16]
-0.2013
[-4.46]
0.0072
[0.08]
-0.3757
[-6.52]
-0.3601
[-7.93]
-0.0820
[-1.46]
0.0615
[0.89]
-0.1057
[-1.35]
-0.0857
[-1.24]
-0.0237
[-0.33]
PR12
-0.2954
[-5.32]
-0.1961
[-3.69]
-0.4442
[-4.00]
-0.113
[-1.66]
-0.3287
[-6.14]
-0.3381
[-5.11]
-0.3019
[-3.71]
-0.4676
[-5.08]
-0.2793
[-3.42]
-0.2464
[-2.95]
Adjusted R2 0.9436 0.9213 0.8271 0.9265 0.9379 0.8842 0.7585 0.8463 0.8330 0.7833
Table 9
The long-run performance of exchange-listing changes.  The sample is 1097 exchange listings from 1975 through 1992. 
Three-year equal weighted buy and hold (panel A) and cumulative abnormal return (panel B) on firms that change exchange
listings are calculated using a size, book-to-market benchmark (see the description of formation of these portfolios in Table III.)
 All returns on these firms and benchmark portfolios are taken from the CRSP monthly files
Panel A: Three-Year Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Returns
All Exchange Listings Exchange Listings
Excluding IPO and SEO Firms
All Firms ASE to
NYSE
Nasdaq to
ASE
NASDAQ
to NYSE
All Firms ASE to
NYSE
Nasdaq to
ASE
NASDAQ
to NYSE
Mean Post-Listing Return 47.60 58.69 40.27 47.93 53.15 60.34 50.66 51.01
Mean Benchmark Return 59.67 72.13 56.90 54.82 59.32 67.51 62.20 50.61
Mean Abnormal Return -12.07 -13.43 -16.63 -6.90 -6.18 -7.17 -11.54 0.39
Median Abnormal Return -30.46 -19.54 -43.90 -24.63 -14.79 -6.96 -26.55 -11.15
Number 1097 258 410 429 708 173 280 255
Panel B: Cumulative Abnormal Returns at six-month intervals (t-statistics in brackets).
All Exchange Listings Exchange Listings
Excluding IPO and SEO Firms
Month Since
Listing
All Firms ASE to
NYSE
Nasdaq to
ASE
NASDAQ
to NYSE
All Firms ASE to
NYSE
Nasdaq to
ASE
NASDAQ
to NYSE
  6 months -1.78 -1.99 -2.43 -1.04 -1.16 -0.55 -2.66 0.14
[-1.94] [-1.58] [-1.55] [-0.71] [-0.92] [-0.31] [-1.50] [0.08]
  12 months -3.22 -1.19 -4.26 -3.46 -1.09 1.43 -2.96 -0.76
[-2.48] [-0.69] [-1.95] [-1.68] [-0.60] [0.58] [-1.24] [-0.32]
  18 months -4.94 -2.99 -4.71 -6.31 -0.85 2.89 -2.00 -2.23
[-3.07] [-1.41] [-1.75] [-2.47] [-0.38] [0.96] [-0.69] [-0.77]
  24 months -7.64 -3.06 -8.61 -9.45 -3.67 2.47 -7.24 -4.14
[-4.07] [-1.24] [-2.76] [-3.16] [-1.43] [0.71] [-2.18] [-1.24]
  30 months -9.84 -2.41 -12.64 -11.69 -4.48 2.65 -8.20 -5.46
[-4.64] [-0.86] [-3.56] [-3.47] [-1.56] [0.68] [-2.20] [-1.49]
  36 months -9.51 -3.59 -12.62 -10.17 -3.40 2.15 -7.17 -3.29
[-4.03] [-1.18] [-3.18] [-2.72] [-1.10] [0.50] [-1.77] [-0.84]
Number 1097 258 410 429 708 173 280 255
Table 10
Fama-French (1993) three and four factor regressions on zero investment portfolios shorting small, growth companies and long SEO
firms. Zero investment portfolios are formed by shorting the smallest and lowest book-to-market portfolio based on quintile breakpoints and going
long on firms which have performed seasoned equity offerings within the past five years.  RMRF is the return on portfolio formed by subtracting the
value weighted market return on all NYSE/ASE/NASDAQ firms (RM) minus the risk free rate (RF) which is the one-month Treasury bill rate.  SMB
(small minus big) is the difference each month between the return on small firms and big firms.  HML (high minus low) is the difference each month
between the return on a portfolio of high book-to-market stocks and the return on a portfolio of low book-to-market stocks. PR12 is the excess return
on winners versus losers based on prior year returns excluding the previous month. The first four columns present regressions using the Fama and
French three factor model while the next four columns employ a four-factor model adding Carhart's momentum factor. Within each set of regressions
we present results for the overall sample and three size sorts. All factors are formed deleting SEO and IPO firms within five years of equity issuance. 
[t-statistics are in brackets.]
Full
Sample
Size Terciles Full
Sample
Size Terciles
Equal
Weighted
Small Medium Large Equal
Weighted
Small Medium Large
Intercepts 0.0011
[1.06]
-0.0018
[-1.24]
0.0021
[0.99]
0.0031
[1.27]
0.0020
[0.61]
-0.0002
[-0.17]
0.0024
[1.11]
0.0038
[1.53]
RMRF 0.1134
[0.11]
0.1391
[3.75]
0.1440
[2.71]
0.0571
[0.94]
0.1185
[2.48]
0.1484
[4.14]
0.1459
[2.75]
0.0613
[1.01]
SMB -0.6979
[-0.70]
-0.1777
[-3.02]
-0.6666
[-7.92]
-1.2485
[-13.02]
-0.6978
[-9.67]
-0.1776
[-3.13]
-0.6666
[-7.92]
-1.2484
[-13.05]
HML -0.1014
[-0.10]
0.0233
[-0.32]
-0.2524
[-2.46]
-0.0756
[-0.65]
-0.1415
[-1.56]
-0.0493
[-0.69]
-0.2673
[-2.53]
-0.1084
[-0.90]
PR12 -0.1972
[-1.85]
-0.3566
[-4.24]
-0.0733
[-0.59]
-0.1613
[-1.14]
Adjusted R2 0.2781 0.0732 0.2334 0.4082 0.2852 0.1344 0.2312 0.4089
